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In Neuroethics at 15: The Current and Future Environment for Neuroethics, the authors identify 
three main themes that should shape the neuroethical debate for the coming years: 1) the rapid 
and continuous developments in new technologies; 2) the expanding global scale of the 
neuroscience landscape, which calls for global guidelines, and 3) the expanding public and 
private applications of neurotechnologies.  
Meanwhile, in their insightful analysis of what the next step of neuroethics should look 
like, the legal aspects, in our view, do not receive sufficient attention. As neurotechnologies 
move from research to application, legal provisions will—and should—increasingly be 
developed, and neuroethics should seize the opportunity to inform these. But the interaction 
between the disciplines should not run in one direction only. There are areas of thinking about 
neurotechnologies—such as mental privacy (Bublitz and Merkel 2014)—where legal thinking 
is arguably more advanced than ethical thinking, and neuroethics should seek to learn from 
legal scholarship in these areas.  
We believe, then that a fourth element should shape the future development of 
neuroethics: collaboration between neuroethical and legal research. As we show below, the 
need for such collaborative research can in fact be tied directly to each of the three themes 
identified by the authors. 
First, rapid technological change. The authors outlined various developments in 
neurotechnologies and artificial intelligence that can be used to harvest brain data, predict and 
monitor behavior and diagnose mental illness. As the authors rightly note, these technologies 
could be applied not only in a medical or private context, but also for legal purposes, e.g., in 
the context of forensic diagnostics and risk assessments (Meynen 2017, Meynen 2019), or for 
the rehabilitation of criminal offenders (Birks and Douglas 2018). Moreover, some 
neurotechnologies, such as brain imaging, are already being used in criminal justice systems 
around the world (e.g., Alimardani and Chin 2019; Hafner 2019). Since criminal law could 
legitimize investigative interventions and criminal sanctions without consent of the person 
concerned, the application of neurotechnologies in this context particularly raises questions 
regarding the subject’s right to mental privacy, cognitive integrity and algorithmic injustice. 
Obviously, these issues involve both ethical and legal concerns (Birks and Douglas 2018; 
Ligthart 2019). For instance, (how) do current legal rights protect the individual’s cognitive 
liberty and privacy? To which extent should an individual’s moral right protect the notions of 
cognitive liberty and privacy? Do ethical considerations show the need for stronger legal 
protection? And if so, how should such protection be legally structured?  
Furthermore, a legal perspective on rapid technological change has another interesting 
characteristic: rather than developing regulations for individual (neuro)technologies, the law 
usually tries to build overarching, sustainable provisions that apply simultaneously to different 
interests of individuals. A more general approach of regulating individuals’ interests would also 
be valuable for the neuroethical debate. This is especially true since many issues debated in the 
current neuroethical literature are not unique to specific novel neurotechnologies, but also arise 
regarding more traditional interventions (Ienca and Andorno 2017). For instance, questions 
regarding privacy, consent, identity and prediction of behavior, have mutatis mutandis also been 
raised by the developments in genetics, and will also occur regarding other, non-
neurotechnological interventions which impact on the psyche of an individual, such as solitary 
confinement or environmental modulation of motivation (Dillon 2019; Douglas 2018). This 
means that as neuroethics starts to develop actual regulations, the scope cannot be limited to 
neuroethics, strictly defined, but has to be broadened to other technologies and interventions 
that are relevant to the psyche more generally and in that sense raise ‘psycho-ethical’ issues.  
Second, the expanding global landscape of neuroscience research. As the authors argue, 
the expanding global scale of current research initiatives calls for more collaboration and 
sharing of data across many different nations and cultures, which raises additional ethical 
challenges. Therefore, the authors propose, international guidelines should be developed in 
order to harmonize ethical standards across collaborating countries. Obviously, the 
globalization of neuroscience and sharing data between different nations – with different legal 
systems – also raise legal questions. An example concerns the legal regulation of personal data 
yielded within the context of a global research project. How will different privacy regulations, 
e.g., of the European Union and China, relate to each other, and how will they regulate sharing 
data of one and the same research project? In other words, if global guidelines are to be 
developed in order to regulate international neuroscientific research, taking into account 
existing legal provisions will be highly relevant. Furthermore, the neuroethical guidelines will 
not only have to take legal considerations into account, but they will probably have some legal 
force themselves. The legal consequences of potential neuroethical guidelines have to be 
considered and thought through carefully. Since legal scholars are experts in translating 
societal, political and moral values into regulative frameworks, collaboration between lawyers 
and ethicists in the development of global neuroethical guidelines would be very valuable.  
Third, increase in applications of neurotechnologies in society. The authors underline 
the increase in the use of neurotechnologies, e.g., by private companies, the military, and 
individual consumers. Today, direct-to-consumer neurotechnologies – like wearable 
electroencephalography – are marketed as ways to inter alia optimize brain fitness and improve 
cognitive functions. From this popularization of neurotechnologies, the authors argue, 
important ethical questions arise regarding safety and efficacy, the management of public 
expectations, and the privacy and integrity of personal data. These are areas in which 
neuroethics is in a strong position to inform the development of the new legal provisions that 
will inevitably be developed. But they are also areas in which existing law will need to be taken 
into account. As neurotechnologies are deployed in society, they are ipso facto subjective to 
regulative national and international legal rules, such as domestic tort law, the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, and even international human rights. As a consequence, ethical 
discussions of the desirability of new legal provisions should start by identifying the ways in 
which current legal frameworks already regulate such use and examining whether, from an 
ethical perspective, those current legal regulations are satisfactory.  
In summary, the three themes that the authors identified, which should shape the future 
of neuroethics, all require close collaboration between neuroethicists and lawyers. In our view, 
neuroethics should be proactive in establishing such a collaboration, because otherwise the law 
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